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The Perils of Productivity 
 
MARK SPOTTSWOOD*   
ABSTRACT 
This Essay urges that those who seek to minimize delay in litigation 
should proceed with greater caution. Productivity reform proponents 
usually assume that an increase in case processing speed can be purchased 
at little cost to other procedural values, but this may not be the case. Such 
reforms may lower the quality of lawyers’ case preparation and worsen the 
quality of judicial decisions. The extent of these effects is unclear because 
the proponents of such changes have not made an effort to establish that 
increases in speed can be achieved without undermining the accuracy of 
litigation outcomes. Relatedly, it is common to assume that reductions in 
time to disposition usually result in increased litigant satisfaction and 
decreased litigation costs. These assumptions, however, are doubtful in 
theory and contrary to the existing empirical evidence. As a result, we 
should be quite cautious before assuming that a reform that speeds case 
processing is an improvement to the litigation process. 
INTRODUCTION 
he drafters of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure identified 
a set of goals that litigation rules should seek to maximize. In Rule 1, 
they asked courts to interpret the new rules so as to “secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”1 
At the outset, the goal of making litigation more “just” was given central 
priority, and the drafters of the original rules gave us many innovations 
designed to increase the accuracy of litigation outcomes. The new 
combination of simplified pleading and broad access to discovery of facts 
in the control of one’s opponents, for instance, made it less likely that 
litigants would lose based either on mere technicalities of the pleading 
 
 * Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. I am grateful to Jay Kesten, 
Murat Mungan, Chad Oldfather, Mark Seidenfeld, Jordan Singer, Franita Tolson, Samuel 
Wiseman, and Mary Ziegler for useful discussions on this topic. I am also indebted to the 
many thoughtful participants at the New England Law Review’s Symposium on measures of 
judicial productivity. Finally, special thanks go to Will Nilson for his excellent research 
assistance. 
1  FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
T 
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process or on lack of access to critical evidence.2 In the words of one of the 
drafters, the new rules were meant to “substitute[] an open, business-like 
and efficient presentation of real issues for the traditional strategy of 
concealment and disguise.”3 
Since then, however, the overall direction of rule reform has generally 
taken a different course. With occasional exceptions,4 changes to the federal 
rules of procedure (or to corresponding state rules) have rarely prioritized 
the goal of reducing outcome errors. Instead, reformers at both the state 
and federal level have focused their efforts on making litigation faster and 
less expensive.5 Indeed, as I write this Essay, the Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference is yet again 
considering a package of proposed amendments that aim to improve early 
case management, proportionality in discovery, and party cooperation. 
These proposals had their genesis in a variety of reform suggestions made 
during a 2010 conference at Duke Law School, and focused on ways to 
“reduc[e] cost and delay in civil litigation.”6 Even after decades of 
consistent reform efforts since the 1950s,7 and even though the overall time-
 
2  See id. at 8, 26–37. 
3  Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MICH. L. REV. 215, 
226 (1937). 
4  The most obvious counterexample was the expansion of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 in 1966. That expansion allowed the rule, which had previously authorized class action 
lawsuits only in a narrow set of historically derived categories, to authorize such suits in a 
broad new category of cases, so long as a judge concluded that common issues predominated 
over individualized ones and the class action would be a superior method of resolving the 
controversy. The hope was that this new provision would allow recovery in cases where the 
“amounts at stake for individuals may be so small that separate suits would be 
impracticable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes. This rule, in other words, 
was enacted so that plaintiffs with small but viable claims would not be deterred from filing 
their suits by the fact that the costs of suing individually were larger than the potential 
recovery. This new category of lawsuit would turn out to be both expensive and time-
consuming, but by finding a way to allow these small-but-valid claims to be brought 
successfully, the new rule arguably promoted the goal of making the system more “just.” 
5  See generally Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its 
Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1091–1102 (2012) (charting the repeated 
prominence of the “cost and delay narrative” in debates about rule reform, and the 
corresponding absence of reforms aimed at making outcomes more just). 
6  Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton (May 8, 2013), in 
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 259–60 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposed-amendments.pdf 
[hereinafter “Campbell Memorandum”]. 
7  See Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 818 (2000). 
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to-disposition in most American civil courts has remained fairly steady,8 
the focus on increasing the pace of litigation continues unabated. 
Still, many might be willing to acknowledge that the issue of speeding 
litigation has been overemphasized relative to other factors, while seeing 
this as a fairly harmless vice. Who, after all, could object to cases being 
decided faster? It turns out, however, that increasing the pace of litigation 
may decrease the accuracy of litigation results, meaning that an 
overemphasis on speed may undermine the primary goal of the original 
rule makers. Moreover, speed alone is not as valuable as many people 
assume. Shortening time-to-disposition has no intrinsic value; rather, it is 
worthwhile if the reduction in delay leads to either happier litigants or 
reduced litigation costs. Neither of those things, however, follow 
automatically from a reduction in case processing time. As a result, the 
value of many proposals intended to speed the litigation process is 
doubtful, and the productivity movement should proceed with greater 
caution. 
 
8  Easily accessible data from the federal courts stretches back approximately twenty years, 
and reveals no noticeable increase in case delay over that stretch of time. Compare 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalCourtManagementStati
stics/2013/district-fcms-profiles-march-2013.pdf&page=1 (showing a median time to 
disposition of 8.4 months in federal civil cases in 2013), with U.S. DISTRICT COURT—JUDICIAL 
CASELOAD PROFILE, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cms.pl 
(reporting federal civil times-to-disposition ranging from seven to nine months from 1992 
through 1997), and JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION 
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 22–23 (1996) 
(measuring a median time-to-disposition below one year in civil cases in federal court during 
the early 1990s). A similarly stable pattern appears in available data on historical levels of 
delay in state court systems, although those courts do exhibit chronically higher levels of 
delay than is the case in the federal system. Compare Robert C. LaFountain & Neal B. Kauder, 
An Empirical Overview of Civil Trial Litigation 3, in 11 CASELOAD HIGHLIGHTS: EXAMINING THE 
WORK OF STATE COURTS (Feb. 2005) (surveying the subset of state tort cases that reached a jury 
trial verdict in 2001 and finding that times to disposition ranged from thirteen to thirty-one 
months, depending on case type), with Thomas Church et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., 
JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1978) (surveying a range 
of state courts and finding median times-to-disposition in tort cases ranging from 288 to 811 
days, with nearly all jurisdictions reporting median times-to-disposition between one and two 
years), and HANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT 56 (1959) (describing a median time-to-
disposition of twenty-one months in routine personal injury cases in the state courts of New 
York during 1950, and finding that this level of delay, although higher than was average at the 
time, was not without historical precedent in that court system). 
 506 New England  Law Review  v. 48 | 503 
I. The Constant Push for Greater Judicial Productivity 
Before I explore some of the reasons to doubt the utility of reforms that 
aim to decrease case processing time, it may help to get a sense of the lay of 
the land. In this section, I will discuss some of the major productivity 
reforms that have been tried in the federal and state court systems. These 
reforms include active and early case management by judges, the use of 
incentives designed to make judges process cases more quickly, the use of 
discovery cut-off dates and firm trial dates to pressure lawyers to do their 
share of the work more quickly, and structural reforms designed to make it 
easier to balance workloads among judges by “unifying” previously 
separated courts. 
A.  Productivity Reforms in the Federal System 
In 1990, Congress, in an effort spear-headed by then-Senator Joseph 
Biden, enacted what is probably the most prominent effort to heighten 
judicial productivity in our nation’s history. Relying on a report from the 
Brookings Institution that decried the rising costs of American litigation,9 
Senator Biden and other members of the Judiciary Committee promoted 
the legislation as “the only way to make judges manage their caseloads 
effectively.”10 To this end, they sought to implement a two-pronged 
approach: In the final version of the legislation as enacted, Congress 
required individual district courts to work together with local attorneys to 
formulate plans to speed case processing in an attempt to encourage 
innovation in case management techniques.11 And at the same time, 
Congress also imposed a shaming penalty on judges who failed to use 
available techniques to process their dockets quickly. Pursuant to the Civil 
Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts 
now publishes a report twice a year that “discloses for each judicial 
officer,” the number of motions and bench trial decisions that have been 
pending for more than six months, as well as the number of cases that have 
 
9  See generally Foreword to JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION (1989). The quality of evidence used to document this problem was quite poor, 
consisting generally of responses to leading survey questions. In fact, the only empirical 
evidence cited in the Brookings report actually contradicted its central claim that delay was 
rising rapidly in the federal courts. See Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive 
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1415–18, 1417 n.121 (1994). 
10  Stephen Labaton, Biden’s Challenge to Federal Courts, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1990, at D2, 
available at 1990 WLNR 2977428.  
11  Michael A. Perino, Drafting Mediation Privileges: Lessons from the Civil Justice Reform Act, 
26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1995). 
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persisted on the court’s docket for more than three years.12 The CJRA, in 
other words, attempted to spur judges both to employ a toolkit of 
management techniques to speed the processing of cases on their dockets, 
and to do their own work at a faster pace. 
The case management aspect of the CJRA failed to deliver the 
promised results and was allowed to sunset. Ten “pilot” jurisdictions were 
singled out for early implementation of the Act’s case processing reforms 
so that the RAND Corporation could study its effects, but the results were 
underwhelming. Eighty-five percent of the judges in the pilot jurisdictions 
reported that their participation in the study had little effect on caseload 
management, suggesting that these reforms were either too weak to spur 
independent federal judges to change their behavior, duplicative with 
efforts they had already undertaken on their own, or both.13 It should thus 
be unsurprising that the RAND team detected “little effect on time to 
disposition [or litigation] costs” when comparing pilot districts to districts 
that had not yet implemented the reforms.14 Parsing their data more finely, 
they did detect some impact of particular case management techniques on 
both cost and delay: Early judicial case management efforts, for example, 
tended to reduce overall case processing time at the expense of heightened 
litigation cost, while shortened discovery cutoff dates reduced both lawyer 
work hours and time to disposition.15 So this first prong of Congress’s 
attempt at speeding and cheapening litigation may have had a beneficial 
effect by clarifying some of the impacts of management techniques that 
were already part of the judicial toolkit. But at a more fundamental level, it 
illustrated the inherent challenges in trying to reshape the ways that judges 
exercise their broad discretion over case processing decisions. 
The second prong, with its shaming penalty, was more effective and is 
still in effect. According to the RAND report, over the five year period 
following the implementation of the new rule requiring disclosure and 
publication, the total share of federal cases that had been pending for more 
than three years fell from 6.8% to 5.2%.16 Quite notably, this happened even 
though overall federal judicial workload, as measured by the total number 
of pending civil cases, was increasing over the same period.17 Even though 
 
12  28 U.S.C. § 476 (2012). 
13  See Heise, supra note 7, at 820; Jeffrey J. Connaughton, Judicial Accountability and the 
CJRA, 49 ALA. L. REV. 251, 253 (1997) (observing that “Congress tried to give judges a new 
pair of Nikes,” but that “[s]ome said, ‘thanks, but I’ve already got a pair,’” while “others 
decided to stick with their old pair of Keds.”). 
14  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 8, at 14, 22.  
15  Id. at 13, 15–17. 
16  Id. at 24. 
17  Id. 
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federal judges have salary and tenure protections, it seems, they still work 
hard to protect their reputations, and at least some of them will work faster 
to avoid being publicly embarrassed. Thus, even after Congress allowed 
most of the provisions of the CJRA to expire in 1996,18 the reporting 
requirement has continued in force to this day, and the Administrative 
Office continues to publish its “list of shame” twice a year.19 In short, in its 
brief experiment with productivity reform, Congress failed to achieve 
significant efficiency gains through its case management reforms, which 
try to alter the dynamics of litigant and lawyer behavior, but it was 
somewhat more successful at prompting judges to do their own work at a 
faster pace. 
Judges and lawyers, of course, also have an interest in increasing the 
efficiency of the justice system, so it should come as no surprise that 
members of the federal judiciary and its bar have continued to pursue their 
own efforts to speed case processing. Some of these efforts have been 
quasi-legislative, enacted through the civil rulemaking process. For 
example, in 1993 the Civil Rules Committee ushered in a new regime in 
which parties were obligated to engage in automatic mandatory 
disclosures early in the life of a case, without waiting for judicial orders or 
discovery requests.20 Reformers hoped that this change might reduce 
adversarialism and expense in the discovery process and ultimately 
“accelerate the preparation and disposition of actions.”21 
More recently, the Civil Rules Committee has circulated a new package 
of proposed amendments, once again with the aim of reducing cost and 
delay in the litigation process. One proposed reform shortens the default 
period in which plaintiffs may serve process on defendants from 120 to 60 
days.22 Another provision would require judges to issue scheduling orders 
 
18  See Hon. William G. Young & Jordan M. Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete 
Model of Federal District Court Productivity, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 55, 66 n.52 (2013). 
19  See, e.g., DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, CIVIL 
JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990: REPORT OF MOTIONS PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BENCH 
TRIALS SUBMITTED MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, BANKRUPTCY APPEALS PENDING MORE THAN SIX 
MONTHS, SOCIAL SECURITY APPEAL CASES PENDING MORE THAN SIX MONTHS, AND CIVIL CASES 
PENDING MORE THAN THREE YEARS (Mar. 31, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/statistics/cjra/2013-03/CJRAMarch2013.pdf.  
20  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C)–(E); Steven S. Gensler, Some Thoughts on the Lawyer’s E-
volving Duties in Discovery, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 528–30 (2009); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over 
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 803–
08 (1990). 
21  William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 
U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 723 (1989). 
22  See Campbell Memorandum, supra note 6, at 261. 
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thirty days earlier than currently required.23 A third proposal deviates from 
current practice by allowing parties to request document discovery before 
the parties first meet to discuss the overall sequencing of discovery under 
Rule 26(f).24 Most of the remaining changes attempt to limit the overall 
quantity of discovery that parties can obtain. Some provisions make 
explicit powers that were already implicit in the rules, while others adjust 
default limits on discovery requests that were subject to variation by court 
order in any event.25 The overall tenor of the recommended changes is 
clear: The current Advisory Committee believes that litigation, especially at 
the pleading and discovery stages, should be conducted at a faster pace. 
Other innovations have remained primarily local affairs. In several 
“rocket dockets,” for instance, local rules and standing orders have been 
used to set “early” and “firm” trial dates.26 The hope is that lawyers will 
conduct discovery more efficiently and experience heightened pressure to 
settle cases promptly in the face of a looming trial that cannot be continued 
to a later date.27 Probably the most radical court in this respect is the 
Eastern District of Virginia, in which trials are typically scheduled to occur 
within seven months after the filing of a complaint.28 The result of this local 
policy is dramatic. The median time to disposition for civil cases in that 
district as measured in 2013 was five months—compared with a national 
average of eight and a half months. The effect on cases that reach a jury 
trial is even starker: The Eastern District of Virginia has a median time to 
trial of nine months, which is less than half the national average of twenty-
six months.29 
B.  Productivity Reforms in State Court Systems 
Although academics have paid less attention to state court productivity 
evaluation, members of the bar and organizations such as the National 
Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) have devoted extensive effort to trying to 
 
23  See id. 
24  See id. at 263. 
25  Id. at 264–69 (making the implicit power to shift costs in discovery, which “is being 
exercised with increasing frequency,” explicit in the text of the newly proposed rule, and 
establishing shorter “presumptive numerical limits” on a variety of discovery devices). 
26  Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. 
REV. 225, 232–33 (1997).  
27  See BROOKINGS INST. REP., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION 19–20 (1989).  
28  Johnson, supra note 26, at 236.  
29  See UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS—NATIONAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD PROFILE 1, 25 
(June 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2013/district-fcms-profiles-june-2013.pdf. 
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understand and fight the causes of delay in state court litigation.30 In 
pursuing this effort, reformers operate on a freer canvas than those who 
would increase the pace of federal lawsuits. There are fewer constitutional 
limits on state court reform, and where they exist, state constitutions are far 
easier to amend.31 This is a happy reality because any sensible analysis 
would give priority to state court productivity improvements. The vast 
majority of American litigation, after all, takes place in state courts, 
including many of our gravest civil and criminal matters. Furthermore, the 
mere fact that state court systems vary in their structure and design gives 
reformers a chance to try new ideas on a small scale and compare the 
results with the status quo ante in other jurisdictions. Thus, looking 
towards the state courts gives us a chance to see a wider array of potential 
productivity reforms in action. 
Academics and other reformers have expressed concerns over the 
productivity of state court systems for quite some time. In a classic 
examination of case processing, focusing on New York City’s trial courts in 
the 1950s, Hans Zeisel, Harry Kalven, and Bernard Buckholz highlighted 
the fact that routine personal injury cases took, on average, twenty-one 
months from the time of filing to disposition, with an even longer average 
of thirty months in the small subset of cases that required the trial stage.32 
In their exploration of ways to reduce this figure, they created an 
interesting inventory of potential productivity reforms. First, since cases 
involving jury trials generally take longer than other kinds of cases, they 
proposed abolishing jury trials in negligence cases and encouraging 
plaintiffs to waive their right to a jury in other kinds of cases.33 They also 
explored several means of increasing the settlement rate, which has the 
potential to drastically speed up case processing; these reforms ranged 
from requiring the use of impartial medical experts, requiring defendants 
to pay pre-judgment interest, and increasing the involvement of trial 
 
30  See Stephen J. Choi et al., Are Judges Overpaid? A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary 
Debate, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 47, 65 (2009) (noting that, in recent times, there have been “almost 
no academic studies” of state court performance); About Us, NCSC, http://www.ncsc.org/ 
About-us.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 
31  See Sean Blanda, The 4 Differences Between the Federal and State Constitutions, CONST. 
DAILY (Oct. 15, 2010), http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2010/10/the-4-differences-between-
the-federal-and-state-constitutions/. 
32  See ZEISEL ET AL., supra note 8. This delay, although not without historical precedent, was 
somewhat higher than had typically been the case over the past half-century in the New York 
City courts that they studied. See id. at 20–21 (noting higher delays in two prior periods, one in 
the early 1920s and the second in the early 1950s, but lower levels of delay in most other 
periods in the preceding 50 years). 
33  See id. at 69. 
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judges as active managers of the litigation process.34 Finally, they 
recommended several means of directly increasing judicial availability, 
such as giving existing judges incentives to spend more time on the bench, 
reassigning judges from areas with lighter caseloads to areas that 
experienced greater demand, or adding more judges to the court system.35 
Since then, numerous other researchers, many operating under the 
umbrella of the NCSC, have promoted a similar agenda, both by 
documenting the extent of delay in state courts across the country and by 
proposing a wide variety of reforms aimed at speeding the processing of 
civil and criminal cases.36 
Broadly speaking, the productivity reforms promoted at the state level 
fall into two major categories. First, many have followed the same strategy 
that dominated in the arena of federal courts reform, and promoted active 
judicial case management as a way to make litigation more efficient. 
Second, many reformers fought for more state court “unification,” arguing 
that a good deal of delay and expense could be eliminated if state courts 
adopted a simpler structure and employed more generalist judges with 
broad jurisdiction, rather than specialist judges limited to specific areas of 
law. 
The case-management solution to reducing delay frames the problem 
to be solved as one of lawyerly tardiness. In their detailed text on best 
practices in case flow management, David Steelman and his coauthors 
promote the idea that inefficiency in case processing arises primarily 
because judges leave too much control in the hands of the parties and their 
attorneys.37 The proposed solution is to require judges to “accept 
responsibility for the movement of cases from the time that they are filed, 
ensuring that no case is unreasonably interrupted in its procedural 
 
34  Id. at 105, 142. 
35  See id. at 174, 181, 206, 209. 
36  See, e.g., THOMAS CHURCH ET AL., supra  note 8, at 4–5 (1978) (noting variation in civil case 
average-time-to-disposition measures ranging from 288 to 811 days, with median times to jury 
trials as high as 1,332 days); DAVID C. STEELMAN ET AL., CASEFLOW MANAGEMENT: THE HEART 
OF COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 137–43 (2000) (arguing that problems of 
delay still plagued the courts, and exploring explanations for the persistence of delay, 
including failures of case management, resource scarcities, and a lack of judicial commitment 
to speeding the pace of litigation); Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Effectiveness of 
Measures to Increase Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Output, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 415, 
415 (1988) (examining the productivity of state appellate courts over a ten-year period). 
37  See STEELMAN ET AL., supra note 36, at 6. As the authors put it at one point, a combination 
of firm deadlines and frequent meetings between the court and the attorneys should be used 
“to ensure that attorneys retain a sense of urgency about case preparation and case progress.” 
Id. (assuming, of course, that attorneys will not be sufficiently motivated by a desire to help 
their clients resolve their disputes to keep cases moving on their own). 
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progress from initiation through completion of all court work.”38 They 
single out two reforms as particularly suited to keeping litigants on track: 
First, courts should intervene early after a case has been filed to meet with 
the parties and establish ongoing control over its processing, establishing a 
schedule of regular meetings so that counsel cannot let the case fall into 
limbo.39 Second, this process should also involve setting “firm and credible 
trial dates,” which are rarely subject to continuance, so that attorneys feel 
compelled to complete discovery and other case preparation activities on 
time.40 Given that nearly all cases will be settled or resolved by a pretrial 
order during the window between filing and trial, the authors intend these 
two reforms to function as the “hammer and anvil of pretrial case flow 
management,” forcing the parties to process their cases efficiently and 
prompting timely settlement.41 
Another reform effort has focused on simplifying the jurisdictional and 
organizational structure of state trial divisions, replacing balkanized 
groups of specialist judges with a single cadre of generalists.42 State courts 
have historically been organized in idiosyncratic ways, with overlapping 
levels of responsibility among differing geographic subdivisions (such as 
city, county, and state courts) as well as “specialty” courts with limited 
subject matter jurisdiction over particular types of cases (such as domestic 
relations and traffic cases). Starting in the 1950s, a number of state courts 
have become caught up in the “wave of reform” known as the “unification 
movement.”43 Unification advocates point to the possibility that a state 
court system with a simple, unitary structure may be able to deploy its 
resources more nimbly, so that fewer cases linger on the docket of one 
over-burdened subdivision while judges and staff in other areas sit idle. 
Many state court systems have been centralized and simplified along these 
lines. Those who proposed such reforms as a means of increasing court 
efficiency have, however, found that such structural reforms have limited 
impacts. Formal unification does not equal practical unification, and many 
courts end up informally designating “specialist judicial officers to hear 
routine, high volume cases” even when the state has a formal policy 
 
38  Id. at 3. 
39  Id. at 3–4. 
40  Id. at 6. 
41  Id. at 22 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
42  See, e.g., INGO KEILITZ ET AL, A STUDY OF COURT CONSOLIDATION IN MAHONING COUNTY, 
OHIO: FINAL REPORT 10 (2011); MARY ANNE LAHEY ET AL., ANALYSIS OF TRIAL COURT 
UNIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA: FINAL REPORT 3 (2000); DAVID B. ROTTMAN & WILLIAM E. 
HEWITT, TRIAL COURT STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE: A CONTEMPORARY REAPPRAISAL (1996); 
ROBERT W. TOBIN, CREATING THE JUDICIAL BRANCH: THE UNFINISHED REFORM 133 (1999). 
43  See KEILITZ, supra note 42, at 4.  
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mandating that all judges be generalists.44 Perhaps for this reason, one 
study of the impacts of unification on efficiency and other metrics in 
various state court systems was unable to detect any consistent relation 
between unified court structures and increases in court efficiency.45 
Thus, reformers at the state level, like those who focus on the federal 
system, have frequently emphasized the importance of increasing the 
speed of the litigation process. Some seek to make judges push lawyers to 
work faster through case management, while others seek to increase 
judicial output through simpler and more flexible court structures. But 
similar to efforts to reform the federal litigation system, these advocates 
have rarely expressed concern that increased litigation speed might come 
at an unacceptable cost. 
II.  Why Productivity Is Perilous 
It may seem strange to argue against productivity in judging; indeed, 
some might think it akin to critiquing puppies, sunshine, or ice cream. But 
although the consumption of ice cream, in moderation, is an unqualified 
good, if we try to maximize our consumption at all costs we will end up 
obese, depressed, and diabetic. So, too, we risk undermining other dispute 
resolution values if we promote speed in judging without attending 
carefully to its potential costs. To be clear, the argument I will make in this 
section is not that delay in litigation is never problematic, or that a 
reduction in time-to-disposition cannot have real benefits. But given the 
widespread enthusiasm for reductions in delay, I believe it is valuable to 
reflect on the downsides that may arise from increases in litigation speed.  
 Before we go further, it may help to offer a few clarifications 
regarding the meaning of terms like “productivity” and “accuracy.” In my 
usage, the term accuracy connotes a close correspondence between the real-
world facts that gave rise to the case and what a relevant decision-maker 
believed those facts to be.46 Thus, when a case is decided by a jury trial the 
outcome is accurate if the jury has a correct picture of the facts that gave 
rise to the case, and inaccurate when they are confused or misled on 
important points. Likewise, if a case is settled before trial, then the 
settlement amount is accurate if both of the lawyers who negotiated the 
settlement amount possessed a fairly complete picture of the underlying 
dispute. By contrast, if one side lacks knowledge of important facts and 
thus agrees to a deal that does not fairly capture the underlying merits of 
 
44  See ROTTMAN & HEWITT, supra note 42, at 6.  
45  Id. at 70. 
46  In a prior paper, I explore the concept of accuracy in litigation outcomes in much more 
depth and propose one protocol by which it could be measured meaningfully. See generally 
Mark Spottswood, Evidence-Based Litigation Reform, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 25, 64–80 (2012). 
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their case, we can say that the settlement outcome was inaccurate.47 
 When I refer to productivity, by contrast, I use it to refer to a court’s 
overall case processing speed. Simply put, a productive court is one that 
decides a lot of cases in a given stretch of time, and an unproductive court 
is one where the judges are (comparatively) asleep at the switch. This has 
been a fairly standard use of the term in the relevant literature.48 By 
contrast, the paper that sparked this conference urges researchers to adopt 
a broader understanding of the term that defines a productive court as one 
that strikes an optimal balance on many metrics of judicial performance, 
including accuracy and efficiency.49 I have no quarrel with such efforts, but 
in this essay I will stick to more standard usage to avoid potential 
confusion. Thus, in the arguments below, the term productivity will refer 
primarily to case processing speed, rather than a broader conception of 
optimal judging. 
First, and most obviously, an increase in case processing speed may 
come at a cost to outcome accuracy. For one thing, judges who work fast 
may work less carefully, and even if they are trying hard to be fair they 
may find themselves drawing more heavily on intuitions and stereotypes 
than if they had more time to decide. For another, judges who put pressure 
on attorneys to increase the pace of their work may buy increased speed at 
the cost of poorer attorney investigation and preparation. The extent to 
 
47  In a useful contribution to this symposium, Chad Oldfather notes that in some cases, the 
question of accuracy may be indeterminate, because the underlying dispute is so murky that it 
may be impossible, with any amount of investigation, to reach inter-subjective agreement 
regarding the real underlying facts of the case. See Chad Oldfather, Against Accuracy (As a 
Measure of Judicial Performance), 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 494 (2014). Although I agree that this 
will sometimes be the case, it does not undermine the overall utility of measuring accuracy, 
given that many cases will be either rightly or wrongly decided, in a way that is clear to most 
objective observers. This point becomes more obvious if one looks, not at the cases that are 
decided following a hotly disputed trial on the merits, but at a pre-trial stage where only a 
partial picture of the facts was available to the relevant decision-maker. See, e.g., David M. 
Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024, 2029–31 (2006) (measuring the accuracy of outcomes in medical 
malpractice cases based on independent physician review of insurer case-files, and 
determining that approximately one-quarter of those cases either gave no compensation to a 
deserving claimant, or compensated a claimant who had not been injured by medical 
negligence). 
48  See Young & Singer, supra note 18, at 62–67 (surveying studies of court productivity and 
showing that productivity “has commonly been understood as a function of how quickly (and 
sometimes how cost-effectively) courts resolve the cases on their dockets”).   
49  See id. at 69 (urging that a “comprehensive analysis” of productivity “must transcend 
pure efficiency measures and account as well for the court’s unique role as a public forum for 
dispute resolution and its ability to provide accurate results and a visibly fair process for all 
parties”). 
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which such trade-offs arise in practice is unknown because (except in a few 
isolated areas of the law) we virtually never make an effort to measure the 
accuracy of litigation, but we should treat these downsides with real 
concern. Especially given the widespread reforms that have already been 
aimed at the problem of delay, and the fact that current delay levels do not 
seem alarming by comparison to some other historical periods,50 we should 
be reluctant to take such risks unless we can be confident that we are not 
buying speed at the cost of justice. 
Second, and less obviously, reducing delay may not deliver the 
benefits that many proponents expect. Common sense may suggest that 
litigants will generally be happier if their cases are resolved more quickly, 
but there are reasons to doubt this based on both theory and empirical 
data. Likewise, although some reforms that increase the speed of litigation 
may reduce overall litigation costs, other productivity reforms tend to 
raise, rather than lower, those costs. Accordingly, even in cases where there 
is no trade-off between speed and accuracy, reductions in delay may not 
accrue any real benefits for participants in the process or society at large. 
A. Potential Trade-offs Between Speed and Accuracy in Litigation 
In a previous section, I surveyed a number of popular approaches to 
reducing delay in the courts. First, we might unify the structure of court 
systems and generalize judicial duties so that the resources we have are 
distributed more evenly. Second, we might encourage judges to put more 
pressure on litigants and their lawyers to do their part of case processing 
more quickly. Third, we might put pressure on the judges themselves to 
hurry their own share of the work. Unfortunately, each of these 
productivity-enhancing reforms may lead to a decline in the quality and 
accuracy of judicial work. The extent of such effects is presently uncertain 
because the interrelation of accuracy and judicial speed has been little 
studied to date. But even our ignorance, if clearly confronted, should make 
us pause before enthusiastically promoting judicial productivity as an end 
in itself. Most of us, I suspect, would ultimately prefer the slow provision 
of substantive justice to the speedier application of arbitrary or unjust 
authority. Accordingly, I will examine the potential accuracy costs of each 
of these productivity reforms in turn. 
First, consider the push towards court unification, which has been an 
increasingly popular strategy for increasing state court efficiency. As 
discussed above, this has proven less sure than some reformers hoped as a 
means of speeding case processing, in part because judges often find 
informal ways to specialize even if they are formally designated as 
 
50  See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (collecting historical evidence on rates of 
delay in federal and state courts). 
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generalists. Such arrangements, if taken too far, may reduce the efficiency 
advantages of unification, as judges may become more likely to resist being 
reassigned in response to new pressures, seeing this as a violation of settled 
expectations. 
But if we consider the relation between accuracy and speed, it will 
appear that judges are right to resist the full extent of unificationist 
proposals. The law presents itself in dizzying varieties, especially in state 
courts of general jurisdiction, and fully generalist judges must constantly 
shift gears between differing rules of substantive law as well as unique 
(and potentially complicated) factual contexts.51 The cognitive costs of such 
switching are high, and may well come at a cost to judicial accuracy and 
the quality of decision-making. If forced to be broad generalists, judges will 
rarely be able to bring deep expertise to bear on a problem in front of them. 
Some may plunge ahead without devoting much time to learning the 
subtleties of new areas as they arise, risking significant errors. Others may 
prefer to spend significant amounts of time educating themselves on each 
new and unfamiliar question. The latter situation may well obviate any 
efficiency benefits that flow from flexibility in assigning judges to cases, 
while the former might both produce some delays of its own (in the form 
of reversals on appeal) as well as degrade the accuracy of judicial 
determinations. Thus, it would appear that judges know something that 
reformers have ignored: Forcing all judges to be generalists, even if it were 
possible, might bring less speed than we would hope, and the speed it 
produces might come at a cost to decisional quality. The end result is that 
the right amount of court unification is a balance point between extremes, 
rather than something to be pursued to its logical limit.52 
Second, there is the strategy of putting increased pressure on litigants 
and their lawyers to speed their share of case processing tasks, which has 
achieved broad buy-in at the federal level as well as an increasing foothold 
in the states. Yet again, it seems that some amount of this may purchase 
faster case processing at little costs, but it can easily be taken too far. Some 
amount of case delay may arise as a simple result of agency costs: Lawyers 
who work on contingency may have a large enough portfolio of cases that 
they do not feel much distress arising out of delay in any single case, and 
may be more willing than their clients to trade more delay for a higher 
 
51  The demands of determining who should be awarded custody of a child in a divorce 
dispute, for example, require a very different set of knowledge and skills than are brought to 
bear in a complex commercial dispute. 
52  Far more could be said here, given the many arguments for and against specialist 
judging in general. See generally Chad M. Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 
WASH. U. L. REV. 847, 847–50 (2012) (urging that strong claims regarding the relationship 
between specialization and accuracy in judging be treated with caution given the lack of 
empirical data and the complex theoretical questions in play). 
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ultimate recovery. The situation is even worse with lawyers paid by the 
hour; they have a straightforward incentive to increase the overall volume 
of litigation work, which may include dragging cases on for longer than is 
necessary, so long as it does not offend clients to the point that the lawyer 
loses repeat business. So if judges can put modest amounts of pressure on 
lawyers to work faster, they might hope to reduce this agency gap to some 
extent. 
The problem, however, is that if pressed too far, lawyers may 
compensate for increased pressure to work quickly by reducing the 
amount of work they invest in particular cases. Legal business does not 
always flow in a steady stream, and lawyers may find themselves facing 
multiple overlapping deadlines at one time due to circumstances outside 
their control. Judges who adopt “rocket docket” levels of case management 
pressure often insist that deadline extensions be given very rarely, so as to 
avoid giving lawyers the impression that they can prolong litigation 
through repeated requests for continuances. But in practice, such a strict 
strategy necessarily risks denying extensions to lawyers who are truly 
underprepared. Here, again, the agency problem raises its head: Clients 
may be ill-prepared to determine whether a disappointing result in a case 
was due to a lawyer’s inadequate preparation or to other factors. As a 
result, over-pressured lawyers may react by preparing some cases less 
carefully when their professional life grows too hectic. 
Third, there is the option of pressuring judges to work faster, whether 
by means of the CJRA’s relatively mild shaming sanctions or through more 
direct threats to their job security in the state systems. This is perhaps the 
most direct route to increasing the speed of case processing, as judges have 
control both over their own productivity, and, through case management 
techniques, that of litigants. But altering judicial workloads may have 
unpredictable impacts on the quality of judicial decision-making. To see 
why, consider a number of possible ways that judges might respond to 
productivity incentives. 
Most existing judicial productivity incentives are discontinuous. For 
example, judges only make the CJRA list if they have pending motions or 
cases that are too old, as of the bi-annual reporting date. Judges, being human, 
do not always work at the same pace. Rather, like many of us, they may 
find themselves working faster under pressure of an imminent deadline, 
and then slowing down when the pressure relaxes. This does, in fact, 
appear to be the case in federal trial courts: A search of Westlaw reveals 
that a substantially larger number of opinions and orders are filed by 
federal trial judges in the month preceding the deadline, as opposed to the 
month after it.53 Judges, therefore, do not always work faster at a steady 
 
53  A search for every “memorandum opinion and order”—a standard heading for a wide 
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pace when given productivity incentives. Instead, many of them seem to be 
as human as the rest of us; they procrastinate until a deadline will take 
effect, and then work faster to make up the difference.54  
 
array of district court decisions—entered during the relevant months can confirm this fact 
relatively quickly. Within the last year, there were 824 such opinions filed during September 
2012 (when the September 30 CJRA deadline was looming) but only 616 in October of that 
year (when the next one was far in the future). Similarly, there were 1081 such opinions 
logged in March 2013, but only 614 filed in April 2013. This disparity (1905 motions in “high 
pressure” months vs. 1230 in “slow” months) amounts to an increase of over 50% of overall 
output. The figure above illustrates this effect going back over the last several years, with the 
red lines indicating reporting deadlines. Others have reported a similar finding in a study 
using docket data, which is more comprehensive than Westlaw’s partial sample of court 
opinions. See INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING 
IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A 21ST  CENTURY ANALYSIS 78–79 (2009), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/IAALS
,%20Civil%20Case%20Processing%20in%20the%20Federal%20District%20Courts.pdf 
(documenting a similar result in a study of 7700 civil cases during a one-year period from late 
2005 through late 2006). These exact numbers were produced using Westlaw Classic. Id. 
54  Those who look closely at the chart may notice a slightly odd phenomenon: The rise in 
workload is much sharper preceding the March 31 deadline than it is leading up to the 
September 30 deadline. My tentative hypothesis is that this phenomenon is an artifact of the 
tendency of federal judges to hire new law clerks each year whose terms of service start in late 
August or early September.  Judges who expect their new clerks to need some “warm-up” 
time may push their departing clerks to pick up the slack. And indeed, that is what we see in 
the data: Each March involves a much higher publication rate than each February, but August 
sometimes beats out September in terms of numbers of opinions filed. Id. 
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 This presents the question in a starker form: If we were litigants, 
should we be indifferent as to whether the judge decided our case during a 
“slow” month or a “busy” month? Or should we prefer one over the other? 
Interestingly, the answer is not obvious, because an increased workload 
might influence judges in different ways.  
Most obviously, judges who are working significantly faster may make 
more mistakes. Although reformers no doubt hope that judges will work 
longer hours, giving up leisure and family time in pursuit of productivity, 
some may simply allocate less time per case. Pressed for time, they may 
take shortcuts in their review of the relevant facts and authorities, or rely 
more heavily on the work of law clerks while taking less time to review 
their work. Some of those errors may be caught by parties, and give rise to 
appeals. If this results in a significant increase in the reversal rate, then the 
apparent gain in speed from deciding the motion quickly may come at a 
cost to the broader goal of speedy resolution of the entire controversy. 
Conversely, if those errors are not reversed, either because the parties or 
the court of appeals miss them, or because they occur in an area where 
appellate courts defer to district court judgment, then some increased 
speed has been obtained at the cost of lowered accuracy. 
Of course, this is not the only possibility. Some judges may have a 
strong commitment to their institutional mission and may make great 
sacrifices to prevent any loss in quality as their workload rises. Others may 
find that their current workload offers ample time for leisure, and find it 
 520 New England  Law Review  v. 48 | 503 
less aversive to give up some of that leisure time when workloads 
temporarily rise.55 It may even be the case that some judges work better 
when they get busier. Judge Posner examined the relation between positive 
external citations to appellate cases and appellate workloads, and 
discovered that a higher caseload led to higher quality decisions on that 
measure, at least within the range of variation encountered in the federal 
courts of appeal.56 Perhaps the imposition of modest levels of stress 
encourages a level of focus and attention that is less likely to be brought to 
bear when judges have a larger capacity of idle time.57 
But the possible effects of increased judicial speed go beyond their 
impacts on judicial attention and diligence. One additional possibility 
arises out of the reality of judicial agency costs. District judges may have 
conflicting preferences: They would like to get their way and decide cases 
in what they feel is the correct way, but they would also like to avoid 
reversal.58 To some extent, judges may be able to resolve this tension by 
creative decision-making. If district judges search (consciously or 
unconsciously) for outcomes that are likely to escape effective appellate 
scrutiny, they might be able to subtly violate a theoretically binding legal 
rule without getting caught. Or similarly, judges might search for reasons 
beyond what the parties offered to help claims pass procedural thresholds, 
relatively secure in the knowledge that the parties will not be able to 
appeal such determinations until much later (and knowing that settlement, 
if it occurs, will likely moot any appeal completely). But especially when 
the parties have not sought to help the judge find such “creative” solutions, 
finding such strategies may take additional time and effort. Making judges 
busier might also make them less creative, and if we wish to encourage 
judges to be more obedient and less independently interventionist, 
decreasing the amount of time they have to decide might actually be a 
good thing.59 
One final way that productivity reforms may impact the accuracy of 
judicial decision-making is by altering the cognitive processing style of 
judges as they decide cases. I have written, in other contexts, about the 
 
55  Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 85–86 (1996) 
(noting judicial complaints about workload sometimes amount to “crying wolf” and how 
courts often have more hidden capacity than they may care to admit).   
56  Id. at 235. 
57  I am grateful to Chad Oldfather for pointing out this intriguing possibility in 
correspondence.  
58  See Joanna Shepherd, Measuring Maximizing Judges: Empirical Legal Studies, Public Choice 
Theory, and Judicial Behavior, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1753, 1758–59 (surveying empirical literature 
that suggests that district judges act strategically to limit the likelihood of appellate reversal). 
59  Whether such “obedience” should factor into our conception of accurate or just decision-
making is a complex question that I cannot address in the short space of an essay.  
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interacting involvement of two different modes of reasoning when judges 
or juries decide cases.60 One set of mental resources, sometimes known as 
“System 1” for short, lets us make decisions swiftly and with little effort. 
The other set of resources, known as “System 2,” requires more 
expenditure of mental effort, but also enables us to think through problems 
in a clear, linear fashion.61 
In ordinary life, we draw on either system to some extent, but our 
moods can shift the balance between these different modes of problem 
solving. A slightly depressed person, for instance, is likely to draw more 
heavily on the slow, deliberative processing style of System 2, while a 
happy person will be more prone to the intuitive “snap-judgments” that 
may arise from System 1.62 Likewise, because System 2 requires some 
expenditure of internal effort to employ, people who are stressed, tired, or 
hungry will tend to use it more sparingly, and to lean more heavily on the 
impulses that flow from System 1 thinking.63 And in fact, it has been 
observed that judicial decisions vary drastically based on swings in the 
judge’s mood: In one study of Israeli judges making parole determinations, 
the likelihood of judicial leniency was quite high when a judge had 
recently eaten and rested, but plunged dramatically the longer he had been 
sitting on the bench without a break.64 Given that most people experience 
negative changes in their mood when pushed to work harder, it seems 
likely that increasing judicial workloads will also alter the ways that judges 
perceive and analyze the cases in front of them, encouraging them to 
process each case in a less reflective, more intuitive way. 
It might initially appear that the obvious thing to do is to lower judicial 
workloads so that judges, experiencing less stress, are more likely to draw 
on their System 2 resources. Careful deliberation, after all, is often thought 
of as a core virtue of judging. But the realities are messier than this simple 
idea. In many contexts, a snap-judgment can out-perform deliberation. For 
 
60  See, e.g., Mark Spottswood, The Hidden Structure of Fact-Finding, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
131, 131 (2013). 
61  For an excellent and accessible introduction to this set of ideas, which are known 
collectively as “Dual Process” cognitive theories, see generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, 
FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
62  Joseph P. Forgas, Affect in Legal and Forensic Settings: The Cognitive Benefits of Not Being 
Too Happy, in EMOTION AND THE LAW: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 13 (2010). 
63  See Martin S. Hagger et al., Ego Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-
Analysis, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 495, 495–96 (2010) (conducting a meta-analysis of studies on self-
regulation, and finding significant negative correlations between the ability to engage in 
effortful self-control tasks, on the one hand, and low levels of blood glucose, as well as 
physical or mental hunger, on the other). 
64  See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 6889, 6890 (2011). 
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instance, when asked which of two foreign cities was larger, or which of 
two stocks was likely to perform better, many people get the answer right 
more often when they “went with their gut” than when they analyzed the 
question analytically.65 In such situations, we often do not have enough 
information to reason analytically, and doing so is as likely to lead us 
astray as to help us. The unconscious mind, therefore, can often implement 
useful shortcuts that our conscious, deliberative reasoning does not have 
access to. Unfortunately, it can also fall prey to certain kinds of systematic 
errors, and is more likely to rely on stereotypes that we would reject if we 
were to consider them consciously.66 On the flip side, numerous studies 
have shown situations in which encouraging people to slow down and 
think harder—in other words, to call upon System 2 resources—improves 
the quality of their decisions.67 Situations involving formal reasoning, such 
as math or logic problems, are especially likely to fall into this category. 
Thus, once again, we find ourselves at an impasse. In some kinds of 
cases, judges would make more accurate decisions if the stress of a higher 
workload forced them to make more snap decisions. On other questions, 
they would probably benefit from having more time to decide, so that they 
could think through complicated doctrinal steps in a systematic way. In the 
end, it seems, an increase in workload might benefit some aspects of 
judicial work, but it also has potentially large downsides in terms of the 
accuracy of the decisions that judges make. Accordingly, productivity 
reformers run a risk of undermining the accuracy of case outcomes if they 
put strong pressures on judges to work faster, to function as broad 
generalists, or to take too strong a hand in case management. 
B. The Interaction Between Speed and Perceived Fairness 
Having seen that increases in speed may often come at the cost of 
accuracy, some readers may still feel that the trade-off will often be 
worthwhile. It is not the sole function of the litigation system to determine 
the right answer. We also wish to deter future misbehavior and ensure that 
members of the public comply with legal commands. But if we wish to 
achieve those goals, deciding cases accurately will not be enough; we must 
also operate the litigation system in a way that commands public trust and 
 
65  See GERD GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS 7–8, 27–
30 (2007) (describing studies in which intuition outperformed analysis). 
66  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 61, at 109–84 (surveying cognitive errors that can arise from 
intuitive judgments). 
67  See Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social 
Cognition, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 255, 264–65 (2008) (describing studies in which cognitive 
errors were increased under conditions where it was harder to access System 2 resources). 
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respect.68 And more generally, our respect for the people involved in the 
litigation process should lead us to try and minimize the amount of distress 
they feel as a result of engaging with the litigation system. Accordingly, we 
have every reason to reduce, to the extent we can, any perception that the 
litigation process is unfair to its participants. 
It is commonplace to assume that, all other things being equal, 
reducing delay makes litigants more satisfied with the overall process. 
Thus, it might seem obvious that one benefit of increases in litigation speed 
is an increase in litigants’ satisfaction and in their perceptions that the 
overall process is fair and trustworthy. It turns out, however, that there are 
reasons to doubt, as a matter of theory, that a faster process will necessarily 
be preferable from the perspective of litigants. And although the empirical 
data on this point are limited, some evidence suggests that litigants do not 
necessarily prefer faster case processing when they actually experience it. 
Thus, we should be cautious before assuming that a faster process is the 
one that well-informed litigants would prefer. 
First, let us consider the theoretic relation between trial duration and 
litigant satisfaction. It seems intuitively obvious that if litigants found the 
process of litigation unpleasant, then they would prefer that trials be 
wrapped up as soon as possible, and thus give higher ratings to procedures 
that were faster. But human psychology is a funny thing, and one of its 
quirks is the phenomenon known as “duration neglect.” A variety of 
studies have shown that in some scenarios, people will remember an 
unpleasant experience more positively if it is longer than if it were shorter. 
For example, participants in one experiment experienced two episodes in 
which their hands were immersed in painfully cold water. In the first 
version of the exposure, they held their hands in 14-degree Celsius water 
for 60 seconds. In the second, they held their hands in the water for 90 
seconds, with the first 60 seconds being at the same 14-degree temperature, 
and with the water then being subtly warmed to a (slightly less painful) 15 
degrees. Strikingly, when given a choice the participants preferred the 90-
second version of the procedure, even though it included all of the pain 
from the 60-second version, plus a bit extra!69 A similar result was observed 
in a study of people’s reactions to painful colonoscopies of varying 
 
68  See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 64, 101 (2006) (providing evidence that 
people are more likely to obey the law when they view legal institutions as legitimate sources 
of authority, and that people’s perceptions that legal procedures are fair is an important 
determinant of their views of the system’s legitimacy); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the 
Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1359 (1985). 
69  See Daniel Kahneman et al., When More Pain is Preferred to Less: Adding a Better End, 4 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 401, 401 (1993). 
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lengths.70 To explain this and other similar findings, the researchers 
developed the theory that our memories of past events tend to follow the 
“peak-end rule”: we remember most clearly the most intense aspects of an 
ongoing experience as well as its end, and we tend to give less attention to 
its overall duration.71 
Once we take duration neglect into account, the connection between 
reducing delay and increasing litigant satisfaction with the process 
becomes more tenuous. We can start with two reasonable assumptions: 
First, most litigants will find the vast majority of the litigation process 
unpleasant, so that at any given moment, they would rather the lawsuit be 
completed than that it continue. Second, the amount of unpleasantness 
varies during the progress of the case, so that some experiences are much 
more unpleasant than others. Being deposed by an adversary’s attorney, 
for instance, is no doubt more stressful for most clients than merely waiting 
an extra day while the lawyers process discovery. 
When we combine these assumptions with the “peak-end rule” 
explanation for duration neglect, we can see that some reforms that shorten 
litigation will nevertheless cause litigants to experience greater displeasure 
when they remember the process. One important component of many 
delay-reduction reforms is the expectation that judges will use their 
discretionary case management toolkit to put increased pressure on 
attorneys and litigants to settle their cases. For example, this is one of the 
central rationales of the “rocket docket” approach to litigation, in which 
courts signal a firm commitment to early trial dates so as to prevent 
lawyers from putting off settlement talks until further down the road. 
Many litigants, however, may find it very unpleasant to feel pressured by 
judges and their own attorneys to settle cases when they feel they have not 
had an opportunity to be heard by a court on the merits of their claims.72 
 
70  See Donald A. Redelmeier & Daniel Kahneman, Patients’ Memories of Painful Medical 
Treatments: Real Time and Retrospective Evaluations of Two Minimally Invasive Procedures, 66 PAIN 
3, 3 (1996). 
71  See KAHNEMAN, supra note 61, at 380. Kahneman has speculated that this effect might 
not arise in situations where people both have pre-existing expectations regarding the 
duration of an event, and find it easy to monitor the length of the event in question. See 
Michael J. Liersch & Craig R.M. McKenzie, Duration Neglect by Numbers—And Its Elimination 
by Graphs, 108 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCS. 303, 303, 305 (2009) (discussing a view 
developed in Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 49 (Gilovich et al., eds., 2002)). 
72  See E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-
ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 63 (1990), available at 
http://130.154.3.14/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3809.pdf (noting that litigants 
whose cases were assigned to mandatory arbitration expressed greater satisfaction with the 
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Moreover, settlement usually ends a case in a more immediate and 
final way than a decision on the merits, which is usually subject to some 
amount of appellate process. Thus, even losing litigants who have their 
cases heard on the merits may derive some satisfaction from having their 
case heard by a decision-maker. They are also likely to have some time to 
get used to the fact that they are likely to lose before the process is finally 
complete. As compared with a litigant whose last moments in litigation 
involve being pressured by persons in positions of trust and authority to 
compromise their own positions without being heard, they may be less 
distressed about the process at the end of litigation. And given the 
phenomenon of duration neglect, this may mean that they find the overall 
process more satisfactory, even if the sum of all the distress they felt during 
the course of the process would be greater if measured in a moment-to-
moment fashion. 
Or consider another popular approach, which is to put pressure on 
judges to manage their own part of the process more quickly. This, too, 
may lead to litigants experiencing greater distress at the “peak” moments 
or at the end of their cases, even if the cases are shorter than they would 
otherwise be. As discussed above, this may lead judges to procrastinate 
until near the point when a delay measurement is made, and then hustle to 
get more cases out the door more quickly. It is quite plausible to think that 
such hurried decisions may feel less fair to litigants than if the court had 
more time to issue a decision. Some judges might substitute short, 
unpublished orders for more reasoned opinions, leading litigants to think 
that their cases were not being taken seriously. And even judges who took 
the time to craft full opinions might devote less time to evaluating each of 
the arguments raised by a party, or might give more cursory explanations 
for why those arguments were being rejected. Once again, we see the risk 
that a delay-reduction measure might lead to a reduction in a litigant’s 
ability to feel like they had been fully heard by a decision-maker, which 
could mean that the final moments of a case were more unpleasant than 
they would otherwise be. Here, again, we might find that such litigants 
would rate the overall process as less fair, even if they avoided some 
unpleasant period of waiting for the court to decide their case. 
Of course, the fact that these things are possible in theory does not 
guarantee that they arise with any frequency in reality. The duration 
neglect studies I have referenced all involve relatively short-duration 
events,73 and it may be the case that the link between duration and 
 
process than those whose cases remained in the ordinary litigation process, and crediting that 
satisfaction, in part, to the greater likelihood of having one’s case heard by a decision maker 
rather than settled out of court). 
73  Both logistics and ethics militate against experiments that require exposing human 
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suffering is more straightforward when events last years rather than 
minutes or hours. But although the empirical evidence that is available on 
this question is fairly minimal, it does lend some support to the idea that at 
least some reductions in delay do not lead litigants to view the process in a 
more positive light. Allan Lind and his co-authors performed a 
comparative study of the factors at play in litigants’ judgments of the 
overall fairness of the litigation process they experienced in tort cases.74 
One of their surprising findings was the failure to detect any consistent 
connection between the actual duration of cases and the extent to which 
litigants felt that the overall process was fair or satisfactory.75 In fact, the 
researchers discovered that the extent to which litigants subjectively 
experienced the process as slow had “only a very weak correlation” with 
the actual length of cases, and even the subjective assessments “did not 
show any consistent relationship to procedural justice judgments.”76 These 
results, moreover, are largely consistent with an earlier study, which found 
some relationship between subjective evaluations of delay and fairness 
judgments, but no connection between fairness judgments and the actual 
duration of cases.77 At least in the tort cases studied by these authors, the 
common-sense assumption that litigants are happier when the process is 
faster has less empirical support than the duration neglect account I 
advanced above. Accordingly, the desire to improve litigants’ satisfaction 
or perceptions that the system is fair provides little justification for reforms 
that aim to speed up the process. 
C. The Interaction Between Speed and Litigation Costs 
Finally, we must also consider the relationship between increased 
speed and overall litigation costs. Once again, it seems commonplace to 
assume that a faster lawsuit is a cheaper lawsuit, and at the extremes this is 
obviously true. A suit that settles shortly after the filing of a complaint, for 
instance, will clearly be cheaper than a similar one that is litigated through 
trial and an appeal, in large part because of the accumulation of billable 
hours in the latter scenario. But this is of only limited relevance to the 
productivity reform conversation, because most reforms aim for more 
 
subjects to adverse events lasting years, so this limit on the experimental data should not be 
surprising. 
74  See E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their 
Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 953–55 (1990). 
75  Id. at 970. 
76  Id. at 971. 
77  E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS’ VIEWS OF TRIAL, 
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 51, 77–78 (1989), 
available at www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R3708.pdf. 
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incremental improvements in litigation speed. When we consider the sort 
of reforms that are commonly proposed, the cost-reduction benefits of 
faster litigation will sometimes (but not always) come to fruition. 
Some productivity reforms appear to reduce overall costs. In a RAND 
study of the efficacy of various reforms piloted under the CJRA, for 
instance, it was observed that the “rocket docket” approach of setting early 
and firm trial dates yielded a “reduction of 1.5 to 2 months in estimated 
time to disposition but no further significant change in lawyer work 
hours.”78 The authors also observed that the practice of scheduling earlier 
discovery cut-offs achieved a similar reduction in time while actually 
reducing overall lawyer work-hours.79 So, some means of making cases go 
faster appear to have either no effects, or salutary effects, on overall 
litigation costs. 
This is not always the case, however. One of the reforms analyzed in 
the same study was the currently popular practice of early judicial case 
management, in which judges set early meetings with counsel to plan the 
discovery process and to explore the possibility of early settlements. The 
case management approach, the researchers found, increases the speed of 
litigation but also increases attorney workload in the early phases of a case. 
As a result, the additional speed comes at the expense of higher overall 
litigation costs.80 
Other reforms have not been similarly studied, but are subject to fairly 
straightforward analysis. Giving judges stronger incentives to do their own 
work faster, such as through the CJRA’s shaming sanction, speeds up case 
processing. Given that parties do not pay judges for their work, and that 
most judges are paid on a salary system that does not adjust upward if 
they work more hours in a day, there appears to be little additional cost to 
either litigants or society from such a system, aside from the minimal 
administrative burdens of monitoring dockets for the number of old cases 
they contain. At the same time, it is not clear that speeding up opinion 
writing necessarily saves litigation costs. That might be the case for those 
orders, such as those resolving motions to dismiss a complaint, which 
happen to halt discovery or other expensive aspects of case processing 
when decided by the court. But it will not be true if the order that is issued 
more quickly allows the litigation to proceed further; nor if it is issued at a 
moment in the case when the attorneys have paused their efforts to await 
the court’s decision, such as when a motion for summary judgment is 
pending or when discovery has been stayed pending the disposition of a 
 
78  See KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 8, at 14. 
79  Id. at 16. 
80  Id. at 14. 
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motion to dismiss. Although such incentives may indeed reduce litigation 
costs some of the time, that may not transpire in the mine run of cases. 
D. Putting It All Together 
Ultimately, striking a balance between accuracy, perceived fairness, 
and costs requires a society to strike a normative balance that is beyond the 
limits of descriptive analysis. Although I have my own intuitions regarding 
the amount of accuracy and fairness we should be willing to pay for, I 
doubt very much that those who make policy are waiting eagerly to hear 
them. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to offer a few observations on the 
kinds of trade-offs that particular reform proposals may engender. 
Before I begin, I wish to offer one brief normative suggestion: Delay 
should not, by itself, be treated as a terminal value for those who are 
involved in the litigation system, nor should it be reduced for its own sake. 
If a case takes longer to decide but the delay neither raises costs nor makes 
litigants unhappy, it is quite difficult to articulate why we should care 
about speeding it up. Rather, delay is worth fighting only when it has a 
harmful impact on more fundamental litigation values. If delay leads 
litigants with valid claims to avoid filing cases, then it undermines 
accuracy by increasing Type 2 errors in the system. If it makes litigants 
frustrated and angry with the process, then it undermines procedural 
fairness judgments and (potentially) the legitimacy of the system itself. 
And if it raises costs, then the resulting harm is obvious. But except in cases 
where a delay reduction proposal will improve the litigation system’s 
performance on one of these other metrics, it does not seem worth 
entertaining seriously. 
Of all the reforms discussed so far, only one—setting early cut-offs of 
the discovery process—has been empirically linked, not just to additional 
speed, but also to cost savings. But although discovery cut-offs can indeed 
speed case termination to some extent,81 they also seem particularly likely 
to involve harmful accuracy trade-offs.  If parties are denied access to 
necessary discovery, then they may lack the ability to discover the facts 
needed to prove their cases at trial, to defeat dispositive motions, or to 
advocate for fair settlements. Of course, it is also possible that parties are 
routinely getting more discovery than they need—although the rules 
authorize judges to prevent this from happening if a party objects that 
discovery requests are too burdensome.82 But the point is that the 
downsides of such changes in terms of accuracy are potentially large, and 
we have good reasons to think that maintaining the accuracy of the system 
 
81  See id. at 26 (reporting a significant impact, but failing to quantify the effect size). 
82  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (authorizing the issuance of protective orders to limit undue 
burdens arising from discovery that is not cost-justified). 
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is worth some additional cost. Unless we can assure ourselves that such 
discovery cut-offs do not prevent a significant number of parties with 
meritorious cases from obtaining recovery, prudence suggests that this 
“reform” should be treated with great caution. 
Now let us consider a currently popular alternative, early and active 
case management, which is an important part of the current Federal Rules 
reform proposal. Intensive and early case management does not reduce 
costs and may in fact increase overall litigation costs by making more work 
for attorneys.83 Those higher financial costs, in turn, may lead to a decline 
in accuracy, if some plaintiffs with marginal claims end up being deterred 
from suing on what are now negative value claims. And although active 
management speeds litigation, it does not seem to do so in a way that will 
make litigants more satisfied with the process, given the phenomenon of 
duration neglect described above. If litigants mainly pay attention to the 
peak moments and final phases of litigation when forming their overall 
opinions of it, then two possibilities may arise from active and early 
management. When the management efforts are focused on establishing 
efficient discovery schedules and other technical matters, then they are 
unlikely to effect fairness judgments at all. When, instead, management is 
used to push litigants into a settlement they might not otherwise agree to, 
then they may find this kind of speedy litigation less pleasant than a more 
protracted affair, which might have allowed them more meaningful 
opportunities to have their case heard on its merits. Either way, it is hard to 
see that the early and active case management efforts are likely to help 
make litigation more accurate, more satisfactory to litigants, or more cost-
effective. 
These examples generalize. We currently lack the information 
necessary to state with confidence that any of the currently popular 
approaches to speeding case processing can improve any key litigation 
value without the risk of a significant detriment to one of the others. Until 
we can bridge this gap, further efforts to combat the “problem” of delay 
will remain a risky proposition. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have attempted to throw cold water on the persistent 
popularity of proposals that aim to reduce delay in litigation, both at the 
federal and state levels. Speeding litigation has no value in itself; rather, we 
should pursue productivity reforms only if they can make litigation 
outcomes more just, make the process feel fairer to litigants, or reduce its 
overall costs. Unfortunately, many reform proposals bear a significant risk 
 
83  KAKALIK ET AL., supra note 8, at 26–28. 
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of degrading the accuracy of litigation. Due to the psychological 
phenomenon of duration neglect, they are also less likely than proponents 
assume to increase litigants’ satisfaction with the process. Finally, many of 
these proposals also fail to realize any meaningful cost savings. Until we 
can better understand the trade-offs involved in speeding up the litigation 
process, further efforts of this kind amount to gambling with other people’s 
well-being, and should be viewed with far more skepticism. 
